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Transnational corporations have become actors with significant political power and authority 
which should entail responsibility and liability, specifically direct liability for complicity in 
human rights violations.  Holding TNCs liable for human rights violations is complicated by the 
discontinuity between the fragmented legal/political structure of the TNC and its integrated 
strategic reality and the international state system which privileges sovereignty and non-
intervention over the protection of individual rights.  However, the post-Westphalian transition – 
the emergence of multiple authorities, increasing ambiguity of borders and jurisdiction and 
blurring of the line between the public and private spheres – should facilitate imposing direct 
responsibility on transnational firms.   Mechanisms for imposing direct responsibility on TNCs 
are considered including voluntary agreements and international law.  However, I conclude that a 
hybrid public-private regime which relies on non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms is likely 
to be both more effective and consistent with the structure of the emerging transnational order. 
 
Talisman Energy, a Canadian oil company, entered Sudan in October 1998 in the midst 
of a brutal civil war.  While the company’s oil production operations were successful, it faced 
both a sustained campaign by activists to link its operations in Sudan (and its institutional 
investors) to violations of human rights and a civil suit in Federal District Court in New York 
under the Alien Torts Claims Act.
1
  As a result, the company’s stock price plummeted and it left 
in less than five years, selling its 25% share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC)
2
 to a subsidiary of the Indian national oil company in March 2003 (Kobrin, 2004).   
 The case was controversial.  While the Company admitted to a small number of instances 
of complicity in violations of human rights by the Sudanese military, it argued that it contributed 
to the development of Sudan and used its resources to “encourage peace, provide economic 
opportunities and support the communities” in which it operated (Corporate Social 
Responsibility Group, 2001, 5 and 16).  Its opponents countered that the revenues from oil 
exploration “fueled the conflict” and that its operations in a war zone led to violations of the 
rights of civilians in the area including their forcible displacement (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; 
Harker, 2000).   
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 In the midst of the dispute, Talisman’s CEO noted that, “…Defining what is properly 
expected of a company needs to be more clearly articulated and rigorously debated” (Corporate 
Social Responsibility Group, 2001: 5).  The Talisman case raises a number of difficult questions 
that require clear articulation and rigorous debate.  Is an investor with operations in an active war 
zone responsible for human rights violations that occur?  Does stating that “oil fueled the 
conflict” necessarily attribute complicity to Talisman?  Who gets to decide?  More generally, 
who should set standards for what constitutes corporate complicity in abuses of human rights?  Is 
a regime or institution necessary to develop norms, monitor violations, judge transgressions and 
impose sanctions: to define, articulate and rigorously debate “what is properly expected of a 
company?”  
My concern is the responsibility of transnational corporations for complicity in violations 
of human rights by their operating units.  There are two overriding questions here.  Should 
transnational corporations – or any corporation – be held accountable directly for human rights 
violations?  If that question is answered affirmatively the positive question of how to hold TNCs 
responsible for human rights violations remains.  The two mechanisms used to attempt to hold 
Talisman liable – the campaign by civil society groups and the civil suit in an American court – 
are ad hoc, unsystematic and unsatisfactory solutions to the problem.   
 I will make a number of arguments in this paper.  First, transnational corporations should 
be held liable directly for human rights violations.  TNCs have become actors with significant 
power and authority in the international political system: they can set standards, supply public 
goods and participate in negotiations; political authority should imply public responsibility.  The 
“traditional notion that only states and state agents can be held responsible for human rights 
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violations is being challenged as the economic and social power of MNEs appears to rise in the 
wake of the increasing integration of the global economy…” (Muchlinski, 2001,31). 
 Second, many of the problems encountered in holding TNCs responsible for human 
rights violations result from the discontinuity between the fragmented legal/political structure of 
the transnational corporation and its integrated strategic and organizational reality.  This 
asymmetry is both related to, and exacerbated by, the traditional Westphalian state system which 
privileges sovereignty and non-intervention over the protection of individual rights.  Third, any 
regime or institution developed to deal with transnational firms’ human rights violations must be 
consistent with the structure of the emerging post-Westphalian transition world order: the 
fragmentation of authority; the increasing ambiguity of borders and jurisdiction; and the blurring 
of the line between the public and private spheres.  I will review a range of possible mechanisms 
for imposing obligations on firms including voluntary agreements and international law, but 
conclude that a hybrid regime which includes both public and private actors and relies on non-
hierarchical, “soft law” mechanisms is likely to be both more effective and consistent with the 
structure of the emerging post-Westphalian or transnational order. 
The Problem 
 Attempts to hold transnational firms as a whole liable for human rights violations by any 
of their subsidiaries are complicated by their political and legal structure.  TNCs operate globally 
through a network of affiliates each of which is incorporated locally and thus a “corporate 
citizen” of its host country.  While it may be “beyond dispute” that all states are under an 
obligation in international law to respect and promote human rights and insure that all entities 
“within their territory or control” comply with human rights standards (Deva, 2004: 49), in 
practice only the home and host country have direct jurisdiction over the TNC’s headquarters or 
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a subsidiary.  While either can, in theory, hold a company liable for violations of international 
law, in most instances neither does.  
The host country is typically the perpetrator, the primary violator of human rights.  It is 
obvious that the Sudanese government had no interest whatsoever in ascertaining whether 
Talisman was complicit in its violations of the rights of its citizens.  On the other hand, while the 
Canadian Government objected to the Company’s investment in Sudan and threatened sanctions, 
for a number of reasons the threats came to naught (Drohan, 1999, 2003; Frank, 1999). 
A host country that is unwilling and a home country that is “unable” to intervene 
juridically are far from atypical.  As Campbell (2006, 258) observes, “…governments are, on the 
whole, neither able nor willing to effectively regulate MNCs, particularly when operating outside 
of their own jurisdiction and even in areas where legal regulation would be appropriate were it 
feasible…”. 
Do TNCs Have Human Rights Obligations? 
 At their core, human rights are moral rights: they flow from the “inherent dignity” and 
“equal and inalienable rights” of all members of the human family (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1998 (1948)); they derive from moral imperatives that are not identified with any 
system of positive law (Campbell, 2006).  From a moral standpoint, the answer to the question 
“do TNCs have human rights obligations?” is unequivocally yes.  Firms have an overriding 
moral obligation to observe basic human rights where ever they operate; respect for the dignity 
of human beings, is a universal or core value that establishes a “moral compass for business 
practices” (Donaldson, 1996).   
 Corporations, however, are rarely accused of direct violations of human rights, of 
removing populations, mounting attacks against civilians or enslavement.  The vast majority of 
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corporate rights violations involve complicity, aiding or abetting violations by another actor, 
most often the host government.  A TNC can directly or indirectly assist in human rights 
violations, it can partner with the government or other firms under situations when it should 
reasonably be able to foresee that violations are likely to occur and it can be “silently” complicit, 
benefiting from the acts of others (Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, 2005).   
As the Talisman case demonstrates, how one translates the moral obligation of firms to 
observe human rights into specific norms defining complicity is far from obvious.  While the 
moral responsibilities of firms underlie any discussion of human rights, my concerns here are 
narrower and more specific: the legal-political obligations of TNCs to avoid complicity in human 
rights abuses and whether and how they can be held accountable directly for violations.   
The Westphalian Context 
Each unit of a transnational corporation is incorporated in a single national jurisdiction; 
its existence as a legal entity – its legal personality -- as well as its legal rights and duties flow 
from that fact. The TNC as a whole is an “apparition…its actuality shifted through the grid of 
state sovereignty into an assortment of secondary rights and contingent liabilities”  (Johns, 1994: 
141) cited in (Cutler, 2001).  Legally and politically the TNC is a group of national corporations 
subject to the laws of different states (Kinley & Tadaki, 2003-04; Vagts, 1970: 739).   
That being the case, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the obligation of any unit 
of a TNC is to obey the law of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated and conversely, that it 
should not be subject to the law of any other jurisdiction.  Legally, the human rights obligations 
of any unit of a TNC would be limited, correspondingly, to those imposed upon it by the state in 
which it operates. 
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 Cutler (2001: 135) notes that after Westphalia the “entire edifice of modern international 
law came to be crafted on the foundation of positive acts of sovereign consent, evidenced 
explicitly in treaty law and implicitly in customary international law.”   In the orthodox or 
traditional view, states are the only subjects of international law, the only entities which possess 
international legal personality and the capacity to have duties and rights (Ruggie, 2004; Wawryk, 
2003).  Corporations are seen as objects whose legal rights and duties are “derivative of, and 
enforceable only by, states who as ‘subjects’ conferred those rights and duties upon them” 
(Cutler, 2001: 13). 
 Westphalian orthodoxy suggests that corporations could not have any direct obligations 
under international law and thus any positive duty to observe human rights (Muchlinski, 2001).  
Treaties are signed by states and international law imposes obligations only on states and not on 
non-state actors. (Pegg, 2003; Vazquez, 2005).  Thus, one could argue that “it is for the state to 
regulate on matters of social importance and for MNE’s to observe the law,” that it is states who 
are responsible for controlling the activities of non-state actors which may have led to human 
rights violations (Muchlinski, 2001: 35).    
 The idea of imposing direct obligations on TNCs for human rights has been seen as 
interventionist, as a neo-colonial extension of power in conflict with the sovereign rights of the 
host state.  The problem is of particular concern to the developing and transitional countries 
where the vast majority of accusations of TNC violations of human rights arise.  This was 
reflected in the last draft of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations 
code which called for TNCs to “respect the national sovereignty of the countries in which they 
operate” and noted that an “entity of a transnational corporation is subject to the laws, 
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regulations and established administrative practices of the country in which it operates” (United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1990,35). 
 Additionally, a number of authors have expressed concern that imposing obligations on 
transnational firms raises the risk of relieving states of at least some of the responsibility for the 
protection of human rights.  Treating corporations as quasi-public institutions raises “a risk that 
the continuing responsibility of states, as the prime movers behind violations of human rights, 
will be downplayed” (Muchlinski, 2001: 44).  In a similar vein, Vazquez is concerned that the 
imposition of direct obligations on private corporations “would result in a significant 
disempowering of states” (2005: 950). 
 More generally, the transnational firm is a product of the Westphalian international 
system (Kobrin, 2001) which rests on the principles of geographic sovereignty, mutually 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction and non-intervention and is thus “fundamentally inhospitable to 
the promotion by states of both human rights and political democracy” (Hurrell, 1999: 277).  
Strict Westphalian notions of sovereignty are incompatible with the idea that a government’s 
actions towards its own citizens within its borders are an appropriate topic for international 
concern.  Conversely, the idea of territoriality limits a state’s authority (and obligations) to acts 
that take place within its borders or the activities of its nationals abroad: there is little incentive 
to intervene to protect human rights abroad, either directly or through the network of a 
transnational firm. 
 While these objections are certainly non-trivial, two related developments provide strong 
arguments for imposing direct public liability for human rights violations on transnational 
corporations.  First, the shift from a state-centric to multi-actor system associated with the 
emergence of a transnational world order has fragmented political authority and blurred the once 
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distinct line between the public and private spheres: both have led to an expanded conception of 
the rights and duties of non-state actors. 
 Second, international law in general and human rights law in particular have evolved in 
the six decades since the Nuremberg trials and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The 
subject-object distinction is not as clear cut as it once was and the scope of international human 
rights law has expanded to the point where a number of authors argue that both individuals and 
corporations have duties as well as rights. 
Private Political Authority 
 Under the Westphalian system, states were the only actors in international politics and the 
only subjects of international law: “the public domain, the interstate sphere, and the realm of 
governance were largely coterminous” (Ruggie, 2004: 505).  Furthermore, during the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 centuries the liberal ideal of a relatively sharp distinction between constitutionally 
sanctioned public power and a private self-regulating market (Collingwood, 2006; Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006), of the separation of the public and private spheres, was a reasonable reflection of 
reality. 
 The context of the corporation is considerably more complex in a post-Westphalian world 
order.  The fragmentation of authority and the conflation of the public and private spheres have 
led to the politicization of the corporation: “the changing interplay of economy, government and 
civil society in a globalizing world…cast doubt on the validity of the established interpretation of 
the corporation of an extension of the private self” (Palazzo et al., 2006, 76).    
 In a path-breaking article over thirty years ago Nye and Keohane  (1971: xxi) argued that 
transnational organizations had become autonomous or quasi-autonomous actors in world 
politics.  They defined world politics as “all political interactions between significant actors in a 
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world system in which a significant actor is any somewhat autonomous individual or 
organization that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with 
other actors across state lines.” 
 More recently, Rosenau (1992) has written of a complex multi-centric world comprised 
of diverse actors, both sovereignty bound and sovereignty free operating in parallel.  What is 
important here, however, is not simply the emergence of significant transnational or sovereignty 
free actors in international politics, but private actors exercising power that is perceived as 
legitimate, actors who are engaged in authoritative decision-making in areas of governance that 
were traditionally the domain of sovereign states (Clougherty & Grajek, 2006; Cutler, 1999, 16; 
Neumayer & Perkins, 2004).  Private political authority exists when non-governmental entities 
are able to exert legitimate authority in the international system (Hall & Biersteker, 2002) and 
effect political outcomes directly rather than through the mediation of states.    
Ruggie (2004: 502) discusses “private authority” and “private governance” in terms of 
the “apparent assumption by TNCs and global business associations of roles traditionally 
associated with public authorities, sometimes in conjunction with CSOs [Civil Society 
Organizations], but more widely on their own…”  Similarly, Vogel (2006) argues that in many 
developing countries companies have taken on responsibilities that were previously held by 
international development agencies or even states and Palazzo and Scherer (2006) observe that 
corporations have assumed social responsibilities that were formally regarded as activities of the 
political system.  
 For example, in 2002 the United Nations announced that it had “abandoned” its policy of 
relying on governments to deal with HIV/AIDs in developing countries and that it would now 
help fund corporate efforts to provide anti-retroviral drugs.  The change in policy was seen as 
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“an acknowledgement that companies have the resources to find health solutions where 
governments and NGOs are overstretched or failing” (Lamont, 2002).  The battle against AIDS 
is but one example of transnational firms being asked to take on duties that were historically the 
responsibilities of governments, to supply public goods.   
 Private governance efforts and the exercise of private political authority are increasingly 
seen as legitimate, as “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, 574).  TNCs have the resources and 
capabilities necessary to supply public goods in the absence of effective international alternatives 
and the ability to provide private governance where public regimes are lacking.  To the extent a 
TNC assuming the role of a quasi-public actor (Palazzo et al., 2006) is perceived as authoritative 
and thus legitimate, that legitimacy reflects judgments about whether the activity is ‘the right 
thing to do,’ whether it effectively promotes social welfare (Palazzo et al., 2006; Suchman, 1995, 
579). 
That is not to say that every exercise of power by a TNC in the international system is 
seen as legitimate and authoritative.  Defining who are legitimate members of the emerging 
world order and which rules and norms determine their legitimacy remains an unanswered 
question (Collingwood, 2006). 
 Authoritatively or not, transnational firms operate directly as powerful autonomous actors 
in international politics.  The development of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) provision of the World Trade Organization in 1994 provides an example. As Sell 
(2003: 1) notes, the “central player in this drama was…the ad hoc US-based twelve member 
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC).”  The IPC, which began as an initiative of Pfizer and 
IBM, put the item on the agenda, developed the standards to be negotiated, determined that the 
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best course of action would be to set minimum standards rather than try to harmonize intellectual 
property rules and was instrumental in reaching the eventual TRIPS agreement (Santoro, 1995; 
Sell, 2003).  “What is new in this case is that industry identified a trade problem, devised a 
solution, and reduced it to a concrete proposal that it then advanced to governments…In effect, 
twelve corporations made public law for the world” (Sell, 2003: 96).  The IPC functioned as a 
private actor in international politics, achieving its objectives directly rather than through the 
mediation of states. 
 As TNCs have emerged as significant actors in international politics there has been a 
corresponding tendency to provide them with direct rights under international law (Ruggie, 
2004).  International treaties, multilateral trade agreements, regional pacts such as NAFTA and 
bilateral treaties all provide significant legal rights for TNCs including the right to resort to 
international law to challenge governmental actions by claiming de facto discrimination or the 
infringement of property rights  (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002; Picciotto, 
2003: 138) and the right  to submit disputes to binding arbitration under the International Center 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Kinley et al., 2003-04).  The fact that TNCs have 
been granted rights under international law is evidence of a systemic evolution in their role from 
that of objects to subjects, which should make the imposition of direct obligations feasible. 
 In summary, transnational firms function as significant actors with private political 
authority in international politics and have been granted significant rights under international 
law; they are “increasingly functioning as participants in the direct creation, application and 
enforcement of transnational law” (Cutler, 2001: 144).  It would seem more than reasonable to 
argue for symmetry, that power, authority and rights should imply duties, obligations and 
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liabilities.  More specifically, that TNCs should be held responsible directly for complicity in 
violations of human rights law. 
The Evolution of Human Rights Law 
 Arguing that power and rights should imply duties and liabilities, however, begs the 
question as to whether duties can be imposed on corporations.  The idea of human rights 
involves both an identifiable subject who has rights and “the existence of a duty-bearer against 
whom those rights can be claimed…” (Pegg, 2003: 16).  The idea that individuals have rights 
under international law underlies the entire human rights project since the Nuremberg trials, the 
signing of the UN Charter, the UN human rights treaties and the emergence of what can be called 
a human rights regime (Donnelly, 2007; Paul, 2001; Vazquez, 2005).  
 Perhaps more important here, Nuremberg established individual responsibility for human 
rights violations under international law, that individuals may be held liable for acts of genocide, 
war crimes or torture (2003 (March 19): 34).  The question is whether one can argue as well that 
corporations have duties and obligations with regard to human rights.   
 The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights imposes obligations to 
promote human rights on “every individual and every organ of society…” (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1998 (1948)).  As Henkin (1999: 25) has argued forcibly,   “(E)very 
individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no 
one, no company, no market, no cyberspace.  The Universal Declaration applies to them all." 
 International law has imposed human rights obligations on entities other than states such 
as rebel groups, individuals accused of war crimes or human rights atrocities and others (Ratner, 
2001).  Judicial decisions in countries other than the United States have recognized obligations 
for human rights on the part of private individuals and corporations (Paust, 2002).  Attempts to 
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hold corporations liable for violations of human rights law reflect the erosion of the border 
between the public and private spheres and the privatization of international law as individuals 
become both subjects and agents (Paul, 2001).  A number of authors argue that corporations can 
be held liable for violations of customary international law, either directly or through national 
courts (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002; Paust, 2002; Ratner, 2001; Wells & 
Elias, 2003).   
 That proposition, however, is not universally accepted.  For example, Vazquez (2005: 
123) argues that “the fact that corporations are powerful and that their behavior is sometimes 
detrimental to human rights are necessary but not sufficient conditions for concluding that 
international law should directly impose human rights obligations on private corporations.”   He 
reiterates the traditional view that while the conduct of non-state actors can certainly give rise to 
a violation of human rights law, it is states and only states that are responsible for those 
violations. 
 The most sensible conclusion seems to be Clapham’s (2006: 71) who argues that the 
questions of subjectivity and personality in international law tend towards circularity and 
suggests that we instead consider whether non-state actors “…have the requisite legal capacity 
directly to acquire rights and obligations under international law?… in what circumstances do 
these actors have the capacity to be party to a claim (either as claimant or defendant) at the 
international level.”   He goes on to note that lack of international jurisdiction to try a corporation 
does not mean that it does not have international legal obligations: “it makes sense to speak of 
the separation between the obligation under international law and the international jurisdiction to 
try the alleged offender” (2006: 27). 
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Structural Issues 
 There is an obvious asymmetry between the legal/political construction of a transnational 
firm as “stringing together corporations created by the laws of different states” (Vagts, 1970: 
739) and strategic or managerial constructions which emphasize control exercised by the center 
over the enterprise as a whole.  Thus Vernon (1971: 4) defines a multinational firm as a “parent 
company that controls a large cluster of corporations of various nationalities” (emphasis added) 
which have “access to a common pool of human and financial resources and seem responsive the 
elements of a common strategy.”   
 How one views the legal nature or conception of the corporation is critical in determining 
whether human rights obligations can be imposed on the TNC as an entity and in evaluating two 
additional barriers to imposing direct human rights obligations on transnational firms: 
extraterritoriality and limited liability.  While the corporation can be seen as an aggregate of its 
members or shareholders, an artificial entity created by the state or a real entity which is neither 
the aggregate of its owners or a creation of the state, but an entity controlled by its managers, 
Avi-Yonah (2005, 811) argues that after every significant change in the role of the corporation, 
the real entity theory ultimately prevailed.  This is true  as well for the latest transformation from 
the uninational to the multinational firm as he notes that the “only thing that ties a modern 
multinational to its home country is the location of its management.”  How the corporation is 
conceived and how one views the autonomy and control of its managers has implications for 
both extraterritoriality and limited liability as barriers to holding the TNC as an entity 
responsible for complicity in human rights violations. 
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 Extraterritoriality is inherent in any attempt to impose human rights obligations on a 
multinational enterprise through its home country headquarters.  While the successful regulation 
of domestic firms may require the “utilization of enterprise principles,” such extraterritorial 
application of the law of the regulating nation runs the risk of clashing with conflicting 
government policies of every nation in which the constituent companies of the multinational 
group are conducting business” (Blumberg, 1993: 168). 
  From the home country’s point of view a subsidiary of one of its transnational firms 
abroad is an alien, a national of the country in which it is incorporated; imposing its law on the 
subsidiary involves sanctioning an act committed outside of its jurisdiction by a foreigner.  
Donnelly (2004) argues that states generally have neither the obligation nor the right to enforce 
human rights obligations on foreigners in foreign territory.    
  While home countries have been reluctant to sanction parent corporations for human 
rights violations of their subsidiaries (UNCTAD, 2007), they have proven more than ready to use 
control as a lever to extend their reach extraterritorially in a number of other issue areas, 
especially those relating to national security.  The United States Government used the Trading 
With the Enemy Act to sanction subsidiaries controlled by American parents for engaging in 
commercial relations with the Peoples Republic of China which was both legal and encouraged 
in their host countries at the time (Kobrin, 1989).  More recently, under the Helms-Burton act 
non-American companies have been sanctioned for trading with or investing in Cuba (Haas, 
1997).   
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Jadwin & Shilling, 1994) holds executives and 
parent corporations responsible for illicit payments to public officials in foreign countries and the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials, which has been ratified by 34 
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countries, requires domestic legislation to criminalize payments to public officials abroad, 
regardless of whether or not there is a physical connection to the act (Corr & Lawler, 1999).   
 In practice, home countries – especially the United States – have been able to exercise 
control over subsidiaries of their transnational firms through their jurisdiction over the 
headquarters when they so desire.  “Obligations that extend to the world wide activities of the 
firm can be placed on the parent company and its directors, to the extent that these activities are 
under the parent company’s de facto control” (Picciotto, 2003: 148).  The real entity theory of 
the corporation appears to prevail here.  Managerial control is of the essence and that control 
extends across borders.   
 Given the changes in the meaning of geographic jurisdiction associated with the 
emergence of a post-Westphalian order, the very selective use of extraterritoriality, and the 
actuality of the TNC as an entity under managerial control, the principle of territoriality should 
be not be a barrier to holding transnational firms as a whole responsible for human rights 
violations by any of their units.   
 A second question is whether the doctrine of limited liability protects the parent from 
being held responsible for violations of human rights by its subsidiaries: whether “the parent 
company of a wholly owned subsidiary is, on the face of it, no more responsible, legally, for the 
unlawful behavior of the subsidiary, than would be, for example a member of the public for the 
negligence of a company in which he owns a single share” (Meeran, 1999: 161).     
The concept has been questioned in a number of countries, particularly in the Alien Torts 
Claims Act cases in the United States (Pegg, 2003).  This is a complex issue which I will not 
pursue here other than to agree with Blumberg (1993: vii) that transnational corporations are 
“challenging the traditional concepts of corporations law and international law;” that legal 
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concepts fashioned to serve a society in which the role of business was limited and local “have 
become archaic in a world where business is conducted worldwide by giant corporate groups, 
comprised of affiliated companies organized in dozens of countries.” 
 The question, however, is whether and how home states can be required to impose 
human rights obligations on their transnational firms: the distinction is between states’ freedom 
to regulate the overseas activities of their TNCs and an obligation to do so.  As an expert 
working group on the topic concluded, neither treaties nor customary international law impose an 
obligation on States to regulate the overseas activities of its TNCs (Human Rights Council, 
2007).   That question leads directly to the primary question raised in this paper: what sort of 
regime or institution is both necessary and desirable to impose human rights obligations on 
transnational firms?   
Holding Transnationals Accountable 
 I will define public responsibility for human rights violations in terms of formalized, 
external, and international accountability: an institution beyond the boundaries of the firm that 
defines complicity, sets standards or norms, develops procedures for monitoring behavior, judges 
potential transgressions and provides for compliance.  A number of other criteria are important if 
it is to be effective.  First, it should be consistent with the evolving parameters of the post-
Westphalian system.  Second, it cannot rely entirely on voluntary enforcement; it has to have 
some means of “compelling” firms to comply with norms.  Third, it must be perceived as both 
legitimate and authoritative.  Last, at least initially the scope of its coverage must be limited to 
the more universally accepted human rights, perhaps in Donaldson’s (1989) terms to those that 
would deprive the transnational firm of its moral right to exist.   
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 Figure 1 categorizes possible modes of imposing human rights obligations on 
transnational firms in terms of two dimensions:  the structure of the political-economic system 
and the nature of compliance mechanisms.
3
  The structure of the system is characterized as either 
international or transnational (vertical axis) and the nature of compliance mechanisms in terms of 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical (horizontal axis). 
 The Westphalian international system comprises a state-centric world of meaningful 
borders and mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  Economic activity consists of traditional 
cross-border flows of trade and investment.  International politics involves interactions among 
sovereign states either bilaterally or in organizations such as the United Nations or OECD.  
While norms at the international level are “weaker, less widely shared, and less taken for 
granted” than they are within states (March & Olsen, 1998,945), they none-the-less exist.  An 
element of international society – of common interests, rules and institutions – has always been 
present in the Westphalian international order (Bull, 1977). 
 A transnational system is definitionally multi-actor where private political authority is a 
reality: states are embedded in a broader and deeper transnational arena.  Borders are 
“transcended” rather than crossed, relations become increasingly “supraterritorial” as distance, 
borders and geographic space itself lose economic and political significance (Scholte, 1997).  It 
is a system in the throes of evolution where uncertainty about structures, relationships, norms 
and institutions abounds.    
 The horizontal dimension specifies the nature of compliance mechanisms which can be 
thought of in terms of two related constructs.  First, “steering modes” can be hierarchical relying 
on the threat of legally enforceable sanctions or non-hierarchical relying on non-state 
mechanisms ranging from incentives and sanctions to moral legitimacy (March et al., 1998; 
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Risse, 2004).  While hierarchical “steering” typically refers to the power of the sovereign state, I 
expand it here to include international law. 
 Second, compliance mechanisms can be “hard” and binding or “soft” and non-binding.  
Traditional international public law is generally thought of in terms of treaties that bind states to 
precisely defined obligations.  It is a model of “hard” international law based on the rights and 
binding obligations of states (Roht-Arriaza, 1995). 
 As Dupuy (1990: 420) so aptly observes “soft’ law is a paradoxical term for defining an 
ambiguous phenomenon.”  Its primary characteristic is that it is non-binding: soft law 
instruments include treaties with non-binding obligations, resolutions and codes formulated and 
accepted by international or regional organizations and statements by private actors which 
purport to formulate international principles (Roht-Arriaza, 1995).  Abbott and Snidal (2000) 
distinguish between hard and soft law in terms of three characteristics:  the degree to which rules 
are obligatory or legally binding; the precision of the rules; and the delegation of functions such 
as monitoring and implementation to third parties.  Hard law then refers to legally binding, 
precise obligations that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.  Soft law 
results from relaxing each of these criteria, particularly the first. 
 Several points are important.  First, the hard-soft law distinction is continuous rather than 
binary.  Second, the lack of legally binding obligations does not mean that adherence to soft law 
is completely voluntary:  agreements may be enforced through a variety of non-hierarchical 
compliance mechanisms such as political pressure or public opinion.  Third, there are numerous 
instances of soft law commitments evolving over time into hard international law: the soft law of 
today can become the hard law of tomorrow (Dupuy, 1990; Hillgenberg, 1999).   
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 Let me return to figure 1 which serves to categorize a number of possibilities for 
imposing human rights obligations on transnational firms which will be discussed in more detail 
below.  The lower left quadrant – non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms under the current 
international system – includes “voluntary” agreements such as the OECD Code for 
Multinational Firms or the U.N. Compact. (As I am concerned only with institutions beyond the 
boundaries of the firm, I will not consider firm or industry codes of conduct such as the Textile 
Industry’s Fair Labor Association.)  The lower right quadrant comprises hierarchical or hard 
compliance mechanisms under international law such as treaty or convention agreed to by states 
that imposes direct or indirect obligations on TNCs. The International Criminal Court established 
by treaty in 1998 “to promote the rule of law and insure that the gravest international crimes do 
not go unpunished”(http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html) is an analog here. 
 The top two quadrants describe outcomes consistent with the evolving transnational order 
which puts us into the realm of speculation.  That said, there is no reason conceptually that 
multiple actors -- including states, TNCs and NGOs -- could not reach an agreement on human 
rights norms or standards and then establish a supranational international institution with formal, 
hierarchical authority to monitor, judge and sanction behavior.  The outcomes would be precise 
and obligatory with monitoring and enforcement delegated to a third party -- it would be a 
transnational equivalent of hard international law.   
It is extremely unlikely, however, that this form of global governance will materialize in 
the foreseeable future.   While the system is no longer state centric, states remain the most 
important and powerful actors and are not likely to cede sovereignty to an international 
institution to impose human rights obligations on TNCs.  The refusal of the United States to 
participate in the International Criminal Court is instructive here. 
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 That leaves us with the fourth quadrant:  non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms that 
are consistent with the evolving transnational order; it is here that one has to sketch the outlines 
of a feasible solution.   That is a difficult task given that the process of systemic change has just 
begun to unfold and that only dim outlines of its eventual endpoint are visible.  I now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of three of the four possibilities, under the assumption that a 
hierarchical or “hard” transnational solution is not feasible at this time.   
Codes of Conduct 
 Both the OECD’s “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”
4
 and the United Nations’ 
“Global Compact”
5
 are examples of voluntary codes promulgated under the auspices of 
international organizations.  The OECD Guidelines are “recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational corporations.  They provide non-binding principles and standards 
for responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws” (OECD, 2000: 15).   Each of 
the thirty-nine signatory countries pledges, at least in theory, to hold their TNCs accountable. 
While the number of allegations of non-compliance submitted through national contact points 
has risen since the 2000 revision of the code, there have been only very few instances of 
effective government responses (BNA Monitoring Service, 2005). 
 The Guidelines reflect the Westphalian principle of non-intervention: the statement of 
principles notes that the subsidiaries of TNCs are subject to the laws of the countries in which 
they operate and that governments “have the right to prescribe the conditions under which 
multinational enterprises operate within their jurisdictions…”  (OECD, 2000: 18).  The provision 
relating to human rights is general and non-specific.  MNEs are to “respect the human rights of 
those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations 
and commitments” (OECD, 2000: 19).  At least one NGO has argued that there “is no conclusive 
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evidence that the Guidelines have had a positive, comprehensive impact on multinational 
enterprises,”  that without effective sanctions there is little incentive for MNCs to comply 
(OECD Watch, 2005: 5). 
 The United Nations’ Global Compact is a voluntary enterprise initiated by Secretary 
General Annan at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in 1999.  As of early 2006 it 
involved nearly 3000 participants including 2500 business firms from 90 countries.
6
  However, 
only 88 of those firms are from the United States and just 103 of those listed in the Financial 
Times’ Global 500 participate.  The Compact does not monitor the behavior of signatory 
companies, rather it “relies on public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-
interest of companies, labour and civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing 
the principles upon which the Global Compact is based.”
7
 
 Two of the ten principles deal with human rights in general terms: the first requires 
businesses to support and respect the promotion of internationally proclaimed human rights and 
the second to make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
8
  While the Compact 
is voluntary and lacks substantial membership among large American transnationals, it does 
comprise a network of firms, NGOs and academic institutions that facilitate both the 
dissemination of best practices and a policy dialog.  Its actual effectiveness, however, has been 
widely questioned as has the accountability of the firms that participate; it is criticized by 
activists for “blue washing” corporative activities, for lending the legitimacy of the United 
Nations to what may be no more than public relations efforts (Picciotto, 2003). 
 Codes of conduct have a number of advantages.  As they are generally non-binding and 
not legal instruments, they can be negotiated relatively quickly and do not threaten the 
sovereignty of states.  They provide a vehicle for discussion of the issues at hand and a forum for 
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building a consensus around an agreed upon set of standards for behavior (International Council 
on Human Rights Policy, 2002).   They can level the playing field, providing a means to hold all 
firms to the same set of benchmarks and correspondingly, provide a consistent framework for 
NGOs and other civil society groups to judge firm conduct.  
 The non-binding nature of codes, the fact that they are typically not legally enforceable, 
does not mean that they are entirely voluntary, that compliance mechanisms do not exist.  
“Consequences” can certainly result from their violation including damage to firms’ brands and 
consumer boycotts.  Perhaps more important, they can establish the moral legitimacy of norms 
and rules and help shape identities, increasing compliance through what March and Olsen 
(March et al., 1998) call the “logic of appropriateness,” a rule-based logic of action.  The Global 
Compact, for example, is designed to work through both consequences resulting from “naming 
and shaming” and argument, persuasion and deliberation which might increase the both the 
moral legitimacy of its norms and group identity (Risse, 2004).  
That said, the voluntary and non-binding nature of codes makes systematic and rigorous 
monitoring by non-participants and enforcement problematic.  As Picciotto (2003: 135) 
observes, “ Too often the fact that these codes were not legally binding was used to justify failure 
or even refusal to back them up with adequate procedures for monitoring compliance or dealing 
with alleged violations.  Thus, ‘non-binding’ was assumed to mean ‘aspirational,’ which is not at 
all the same thing.”     
International Law 
 Both proponents and opponents of the idea agree that there is no conceptual impediment 
in international law to an agreement among states imposing obligations on private parties such as 
business firms (Ratner, 2001; Vazquez, 2005).  A treaty or convention, for example, could 
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establish legally binding standards which could be enforced either directly on transnational firms 
or indirectly by obliging states to ensure that companies respect human rights (International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002; Muchlinski, 2001).  The question is whether doing so is 
feasible or desirable.  These issues generate considerable debate in the literature which can only 
be touched upon here.   
 Ratner (2001: 448) believes that the international legal process should place direct human 
rights obligations on corporations; “International law offers a process for appraising, and in the 
end resolving, the demands that governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
organizations are now making of private enterprises.”  He argues that international law has 
already recognized human rights obligations on entities other than states and that the same 
arguments apply to corporations: “the question is not whether nonstate actors have rights and 
duties, but what those rights and duties are” (Ratner, 2001: 476).   
 Ratner argues that corporations should have duties to avoid both direct infringement of 
human rights and complicity in illegal conduct by a government.  He suggests the possibility of a 
treaty resulting in a binding code of conduct, with enforcement mechanisms which could include 
a monitoring body which could hear complaints from a variety of sources, domestic enforcement 
through national authorities, and “a free-standing body” authorized to determine if corporations 
have violated their human rights duties and impose sanctions. 
 In “Beyond Voluntarism” the International Council on Human Rights Policy (2002: 7) 
concludes that “international law has a role to play in ensuring that companies respect human 
rights” including clear international rules to strengthen states’ obligations and direct legal 
obligations on companies, where appropriate.  Their argument is based on the limits of 
voluntarism, the impact of globalization on the efficacy of national regulation, the increased 
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power of TNCs, the existence of rights of private companies in international law and an analysis 
of the evolution of human rights law since the founding of the United Nations. 
 The most notable attempt to impose direct human rights obligations on transnational 
firms is the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights which were approved by the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion of Human Rights of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2003.  The 
Norms state that while states have the primary responsibility to protect and promote human 
rights, “Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises have the obligation to respect, ensure respect for, prevent abuses of, 
and promote human rights recognized in international as well as national law” (United Nations 
Social and Economic Council, 2003). 
 Three points are important here.  First, the Norms reaffirm that it is states that have the 
primary responsibility for human rights.  Second, they appear to go beyond negative obligations 
to avoid abuse and impose a positive duty on transnational firms to promote human rights.  Last, 
and perhaps most important, the draft Norms “attempt to impose direct responsibilities on 
business entities as a means of achieving comprehensive protection of all human rights…” (Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2005: 9).   In doing so, they 
would go beyond international human rights law as it currently exists.  The Norms, if adopted, 
would be neither a convention nor a treaty: their legal authority would derive from their sources 
in treaties and customary international law and from their restatement of international law 
applicable to companies (Weissbrodt & Kruger, 2003). 
 There has been considerable opposition to the Norms from the corporate community (and 
others) including concerns that the Norms dilute the responsibility of states for human rights, that 
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they are a misstatement of international law and that they are unduly negative towards business.  
The Commission on Human Rights declined to adopt the Norms in 2004, arguing that while they 
“contain useful elements and ideas” they have no legal standing (Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2005; Vazquez, 2005). 
 There are a number of advantages to imposing human rights obligations on transnational 
firms through international law.  As noted above, there are serious limitations to voluntary 
standards: duties imposed through the force of law would be obligatory.  Second, implementing 
obligations through international law would require that applicable standards be thought through 
and negotiated by the international community.  A clear set of internationally agreed upon 
standards that are transparent and broadly applicable would benefit of transnational firms by 
removing uncertainty and leveling the playing field.   Third, a convention or treaty could 
establish mechanisms for monitoring behavior, judging possible violations and imposing 
sanctions, either indirectly through states or directly through an international institution.    
That said, imposing human rights obligations on transnational firms entails a number of 
potentially serious problems.   It is difficult to extend hierarchical “hard law” compliance 
mechanisms beyond the borders of the state given the lack of an ultimate authority in the 
international political system.   It is far from clear that the “international community” could agree 
on a meaningful set of standards for behavior even if its writ were limited to the most serious 
violations of human rights.  Doing so would involve both agreeing on the norms of behavior 
themselves and the responsibilities of private actors.  The problem here is exacerbated by the 
emergence of significant new actors in the world economy such as China and India who do not 
appear to be overly concerned with the human rights implications of their firms’ investments 
abroad and have a reluctance to “interfere” in the domestic affairs of others. 
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 Even if the international community could agree on a set of standards through a treaty or 
convention enforcement is likely to remain a serious problem.  At this point, it appears that the 
most likely outcome would be to establish indirect obligations on companies by holding states 
responsible for the behavior of “their” TNCs.  That would be problematic to say the least: states 
that are reluctant to intervene across borders to protect human rights directly may be less than 
likely to do so through the network of their transnational firms.  There are marked differences 
across states – even among the industrialized countries – in terms of beliefs about the market 
versus regulation, the relationship between corporations and government, and the power of the 
corporate community.  It would be unreasonable to expect uniform enforcement of any 
international norms.    
While these problems could be resolved by agreement to impose direct obligations on 
TNCs under the aegis of an international institution, that outcome is not likely in the foreseeable 
future.  “(T)he imposition of direct obligations on private corporations, backed by an effective 
international mechanism to enforce those obligations, would represent a significant 
disempowering of states.”  States are likely to resist that sort of change strongly and obligations 
without an effective enforcement mechanism are likely to fail (Vazquez, 2005: 150). 
 Last, imposing human rights obligations on transnational firms – directly or indirectly – 
through “hard” international law is anachronistic (Roht-Arriaza, 1995).  It is an attempt to 
impose a solution derived from the Westphalian international system on a post-Westphalian 
order.  While recognizing that private actors such as transnational firms could be subjects of 
international law may accept the reality of the early twenty-first century, it is still an attempt to 
force a square peg into a round hole, an attempt to adapt state-centric international law to a 
multi-actor environment. 
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A Transnational Solution 
  Regimes have been defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner, 1982).   
While regime theory was developed to explain the ability of states to sustain cooperative efforts 
over time, hybrid or mixed regimes are now emerging which involve states, international 
organizations, NGOs and the private sector in establishing principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures (Clapp, 1998; Livermore, 2006; Risse, 2004).  To some extent hybrid 
regimes reflect an absence of public governance in the global arena; as Haufler (2001: 29) notes 
in a different context,  “…when governments are unwilling or unable to govern effectively, 
political leaders may see private governance as a valuable tool to achieve public ends”  
 One example of a non-governmental institution which can “be an authoritative source of 
rules to which states or firms commit” is the International Organization for Standardization or 
ISO (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000).  ISO, founded in 1946, is a network of the national standards 
institutes of 156 countries with a central secretariat in Geneva.  It has been called an “informal-
decentralized international institution” (Clougherty et al., 2006: 4).  “ISO occupies a special 
position between the public and private sectors. On the one hand, many of its member institutes 
are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their government; on 
the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set up 
by national partnerships of industry associations.”
9
   
 ISO’s standards are “voluntary.”  However, as Roht-Arriaza (1995: 487) observes, the 
process is neither fully private nor fully voluntary.  “The standards may affect the public 
regulatory process in a number of ways: global and regional trade agreements may explicitly 
recognize them; government regulations may refer to them for definition of terms; and 
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government procurement rules may adopt them.  Further, market pressure from consumers, 
financiers, insurers, and competitors may convert them to prerequisites for companies wanting to 
do business in large markets”.   
 ISO has broadened its reach considerably with its 9000 quality control standards (1987) 
and is blurring the line between the private and public spheres with its 14000 environmental 
standards which have been adopted  by standard-setting bodies in some states and are recognized 
by the World Trade Organization (Clapp, 1998).  Increasingly, ISO sets industry standards in 
conjunction with or in addition to those set by domestic regulators (Spiro, 1996: 967).  
 ISO provides an example of an issue specific hybrid regime where non-hierarchical 
compliance mechanisms relying on soft law morphed, in part, into hierarchical compliance 
enforced through hard law as the standards were incorporated in states’ regulatory frameworks.  
A second example of soft law standards emerging as hard law over time is the Codex 
Alimentarius which provided voluntary standards for food quality until 1995 when it was 
incorporated into the then new World Trade Organization (Livermore, 2006). 
 Windsor (2004) envisions the establishment of international business norms through the 
evolution of multiple policy regimes fragmented by both issue area and region.  One possibility 
could be a transnational regime comprised of all of the relevant actors (states, firms, NGOs and 
international organizations) which would serve as a focal point for developing norms and rules 
regarding corporate complicity in human rights violations. It could later develop into an 
institution engaged in monitoring violations, judging transgressions and enforcing compliance. 
 While TNCs (and all firms) have unequivocal moral obligations to respect human rights, 
norms and rules regarding what constitutes corporate complicity in violations by others are far 
from clear.  Given the public pressures on transnational firms for “socially responsible behavior” 
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and the increasing abilities of NGOs and other private actors to impose meaningful sanctions on 
perceived miscreants, it should be in the interest of TNCs, NGOs, states (with the exception of 
those who are the “perpetrators”) and international organizations to develop clear, transparent 
and widely accepted standards for the responsibilities of transnationals vis-à-vis human rights 
violations.   
 There has been some degree of convergence among states, TNCs and NGOs on human 
rights norms, at least among North American and European firms and governments.  The 
extractive industry’s Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights, 2006) and the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD, 2001) have had relatively wide acceptance even if compliance is an issue.     
 Establishing norms and setting standards, however, is necessary but not sufficient.  “One 
of the main problems of contemporary global governance is to decrease the growing gap between 
international norm acceptance, on the one hand, and rule compliance, on the other”  (Risse, 2004, 
305).  If an institution charged with imposing direct obligations on TNCs for complicity in 
human rights violations is to be effective it must also provide mechanisms for monitoring 
behavior, judging transgressions and ensuring compliance.   That is where the analogy with ISO 
breaks down.  While there are provisions for audits of firms seeking certification, the ISO 9000 
quality standards are, to some extent, self-monitoring and self-enforcing through the market.   
 A supranational institution with the ability to enforce compliance through “hard” 
transnational law is not feasible at this point and, given the very rudimentary state of global 
governance, may not even be desirable.   Thus, for the foreseeable future, compliance with 
norms establishing rules for avoiding complicity in human rights violations by TNCs will have to 
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be obtained through non-hierarchical steering mechanisms (Risse, 2004), though soft law 
solutions. 
 To the extent that norms or standards for TNCs with regard to human rights result from a 
transparent, inclusive process involving multiple actors, they should be perceived as legitimate 
and authoritative.   Clear and authoritative standards defining what constitutes complicity in 
human rights violations should increase the efficacy of compliance driven by “expected 
consequences,” by some combination of “positive incentives and negative sanctions” (March et 
al., 1998; Risse, 2004), such as civil society campaigns, consumer boycotts and the like.  That is, 
authoritative norms should both increase the rewards to companies for compliance and the 
impact of penalties imposed for their violation. 
 March and Olsen (1998,946, 963) suggest that international identities may evolve 
through expert cooperation around specific tasks as problems are defined as international in 
scope and meaning as transcending borders.  They note that while actors may enter into new 
relationships for instrumental reasons, the development of identities which result from their 
engagement can shift the bases for action from expected consequences toward rules:  “political 
actors acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publically 
known, anticipated and accepted.”  
 Compliance could then result from a “logic of appropriateness,” from constructing an 
identity and “matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation”  (March et 
al., 1998, 951-52).   Acceptance of a logic of appropriateness involves acceptance of the moral 
legitimacy of the norms and rules in question.  As Palazzo and Scherer note (2006), moral 
legitimacy becomes critically important in the global sphere where normative standards are not 
yet broadly accepted and governance mechanisms are weak or non-existent.   A transnational 
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institution focused on the human rights obligations of TNCs would provide the opportunity for 
learning, persuasion and deliberation which would be critical to acceptance of the moral 
legitimacy or authoritativeness of the norms, standards and rules which evolve (Palazzo et al., 
2006; Risse, 2004).   
 It might also provide an opportunity for democratic governance in this area.  While I can 
only touch on the topic here, a number of authors consider open and sustained deliberation as a 
means of providing a form of democracy in a transnational sphere comprised of overlapping 
communities which no longer coincide with national borders (Held, 2006; McGrew, 1997, 2003). 
 Norms or standards must accept both the reality of the post-Westphalian transition and 
the fact that the TNC functions globally under the control of its management (Avi-Yonah, 2005) 
if they are to be effective.  In a transnational world order, the idea of extraterritoriality is less and 
less relevant, especially in the context of the obligations of, or control over, the transnational 
corporation.   The TNCs as an entity is, and should be, held responsible for violations of norms 
by any of its units, and home countries should be responsible” for holding TNCs as a whole 
liable for any violations of the agreed upon norms by any of their units, regardless of where they 
are located.  A hybrid transnational institution which brought together the relevant actors to 
agree on a set of authoritative human rights standards for TNCs and established the principle of 
an enterprise’s responsibility for the actions of all of its component parts would represent a major 
step forward that is consistent with the emerging post-Westphalian system. 
At this point it is difficult to envision the outlines of a hybrid public-private institution 
that would have the power, authority, and resources to monitor, judge and effectively sanction 
violations.   However, some means of systematic monitoring of behavior and judging 
transgressions is necessary if the norms are to achieve moral legitimacy.  It is critically important 
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that all involved believe that the probability of being “caught” is not simply a function of chance 
or visibility and that the playing field is level, that all those accused of transgressions are judged 
fairly.  Thus, in addition to setting standards, a putative multi-actor institution would have to 
have the authority and resources to set up some sort of monitoring mechanism and “tribunal.”    
   As noted above, the establishment of an authoritative, multiactor, transnational regime 
should increase the probability of effectiveness of the non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms 
discussed here.  That said, I would hope that over time a regime would develop into an 
autonomous transnational institution and non-hierarchical, soft law norms would evolve into 
hard, enforceable human rights obligations imposed directly on the TNC as an entity.  In the 
longer run, global governance cannot rely entirely on soft law and non-hierarchical compliance 
mechanisms if it is to be effective.  The problem here, which I cannot resolve in this paper, is 
what hard “transnational law” will mean in the context of a more fully evolved post-Westphalian 
world order.    
While the evolution of a transnational institution dealing with the human rights 
obligations of TNCs has the advantages discussed above, there are a number of very real 
problems associated with it.  First, it is based on assumption that is far from universally accepted: 
the reality of the transition to a transnational world order.  It is far from clear whether the trends 
discussed here represent only minor modifications in the international state system or “a major 
transformation of the constitutive principles and practices of international political life” (March 
et al., 1998, 947).   
 Second, states are still the most important actors in world politics and an effective, 
autonomous transnational institution would require a consensual relinquishment of sovereign 
authority that has yet to occur.  This is particularly relevant here given the reluctance of 
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emerging powers such as China and India to accept intervention to protect human rights. Third, 
non-state actors such as NGOs and TNCs have a long way to go before they are fully accepted as 
legitimate and authoritative.   Last, there are very serious questions about whether any relatively 
autonomous transnational institution would be perceived as democratic: at this point deliberative 
democracy is an unproven concept.   
 Thus, a preference for a putative transnational regime versus codes or international law as 
a solution to the problem of imposing obligations on TNCs for complicity in violations of human 
can be seen as a preference for the ephemeral rather than the existing.   However, to the extent 
one believes that we are in the midst of a major systemic transformation of world politics, it is 
also can also be seen as a preference for the future rather than the past.   
I believe that over time new transnational governance institutions will evolve which are 
not public in the sense of solely state-based, but which will have the authority and power to 
judge violations and impose sanctions.   At that point, the distinction between public and private 
authority may have lost meaning. 
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Multinational Firms and Human Rights Obligations 
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1
 The Alien Tort Claims Act permits aliens to sue in a US court for torts committed abroad in violation of “the law 
of nations” or a treaty of the United States.  Courts have held that gross violations of human rights violate the law of 
nations and are thus actionable under the law (Blumberg, 2002; Bridgeford, 2003; Olsen, 2002).  The Talisman case 
was dismissed in 2006 due to a lack of admissible evidence (2006 (December 1): 5). 
2
 The other participants in GNOPC were The China National Petroleum Company holding 40%, Petronas of 
Malaysia 30% and the Sudanese national company 5%  (Sudan Update, 1999).  Talisman was the primary operating 
company.  
3
 Esty (2006) suggests that the “thickness” of supranational governance can be portrayed in terms of who holds 
decision-making authority and whether the results of the decision process are formal and binding. 
4
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf 
5
 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
6
 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html 
7
 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html.  It should be noted that when the Compact discusses 
human rights, it refers to moral obligations under the Universal Declaration and the specific obligations undertaken 
when enrolling. 
8
 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html   
9
 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html. 
